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HE effect of Cardozo upon the progress of the law cannot be
judged merely by looking to his writings. As all who knew
him are aware, the man was even greater than the judge. His
passion for justice and his fear lest act or work of his should de-
prive anyone of that to which he was entitled appeared in his
voice and words, as his love for humanity was apparent in his face.
I suspect that Cardozo's greatest contribution was, as was that
of James Barr Ames, the instilling into those with whom he came
into personal contact a small part of the spirit which animated
him. Each in his separate sphere was an apostle of the spirit of
justice which lies at the roots of the common law and which is
greater than the law itself. No one could long be with Cardozo
without realizing that with the simplicity, modesty and gentleness
of his character there was a driving spirit seeking to right the
wrongs of the world. But his effect upon the law by direct per-
sonal contact is beyond my powers of appraisal. I knew him
only as one of many whom he brushed in passing, leaving a sense
of a great presence. In the attempt to appraise what he did
for the law of torts, I shall speak only on the record made by
his opinions in decided cases. First a few generalizations.
Cardozo was a progressive judge but not primarily a reforming
judge. He did not remake the law of torts. On the contrary,
by and large, he accepted the common law as he found it, merely
choosing between precedents where choice was possible, and
choosing the best. His power lay in his ability to see the plan
and pattern underlying the law and to make clear the paths which
had been obscured by the undergrowth of illogical reasoning.
Perhaps because he realized the power of the court to make law,
he was cautious in using this power, or perhaps his reluctance
was due to the great intellectual modesty which was as obvious
as it was real. It is true, however, that in all but a few of the
tort cases in which he participated, his function was chiefly to
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clarify principles and not to create new interests. He was a
critical but nevertheless a fond lover of the common law, real-
izing that it was not perfect but with faith that with gentle pres-
sure it would respond adequately to the needs of those whom it
served. In the few instances in which he went beyond the clear
line of well-defined authority, he took but short steps, careful
to preserve the principle that change should be gradual. At
times, fearful of the consequences of an untried rule, he was un-
willing to depart from precedent in extending liability where this
might well have been done or where consistency to principle
seemed to require it.
His entire record indicates that he did not first decide from
some internal and unexplainable sense of justice that one of the
parties was entitled to the decision and then find or invent a for-
mula to fit the facts. Instead, he used principles deduced from
the cases and weighed competing interests as bad the judges who
had gone before him. Nor did he allow his private opinions of
policy to sway him from the lines into which the law had been
moulded. He did his full part in causing the court to be a court
of justice, but it was not by destroying it as a court of law. Per-
sonally solicitous for the poor and the maimed, and in criminal
cases eager to find the scintilla of doubt which would keep from
punishment one accused of crime, he did not become the pro-
tector of the injured merely because the defendant had ample
funds to meet a judgment or had an ability to spread the loss.
His scales were those of legal justice, not sentimental justice.
As is true of most judges sitting on appellate courts, he was fre-
quently called upon to perform the unwelcome task of denying
compensation to persons who had been hurt and for whom he
must have had great sympathy, but in whose favor a judgment
contrary to existing rules had been rendered in a lower court by
mistake or prejudice. In fact, in a majority of the tort cases in
which he rendered opinions, the court denied the plaintiff recovery
and, in most of the cases, deprived him of the judgment which had
been awarded to him in a lower court.
I have no-doubt that Cardozo was the most important single
influence in the development of torts in recent years. It is not
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chance that he was at his best in this field which touches most
closely the everyday life of the community. Impatient of purely
legalistic reasoning, interested primarily in people rather than in
the intricacies of business, he found in torts perhaps the best
field for the expression of his philosophy of life. With his power
of understanding principles behind the rules and of expressing
them in striking and unforgettable terms, he has become as truly
a teacher of the lawyers of the future as are the instructors in
the schools. Disregarding the occasional over-ornate method of
expression, which at least did not lead to misunderstanding as
did some of Holmes' cryptic statements, his opinions are models
for courts and students alike. No school can afford to do without
them in the instruction of students and no court can disregard
them in dealing with matters upon which he has spoken. Prin-
ciples, distorted by judicial errors or clouded by the over-use of
fictions, are made manifest. Because he is picturing human prob-
lems and not merely manipulating legal formulae, the reading
of his opinions is an intellectual adventure. Seldom does he evade
logical difficulties; his work has a nicety of balance which by
and large compels conviction, both to the professors whose tend-
ency is to seek new rules and to create new interests and to the
practicing lawyers who ordinarily dislike both new wine and old
wine served in new bottles. In my own case, a re-reading of all
the tort cases in which Cardozo rendered opinions leaves me with
doubts as to the decisions of only two of them and in those two I
am very likely wrong. I shall speak of them later.
NEGLIGENCE
Cardozo's greatest contribution to the law of torts was in the
field of negligence, the principles of which are as simple as their
application is difficult. To understand what he did in this branch
of the law, it may be desirable to summarize its condition in 1914
when he came to the bench.
The generalizations had already been made. It was no longer
a patchwork built upon the ancient doctrine of trespass. The
courts were tending to accept the famous statement of Brett,
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M. R., in Heaven v. Pender, "that actionable negligence consists
of the neglect of the use of ordinary care or skill towards a person
to whom the defendant owes a duty of observing ordinary care or
skill, by which neglect the plaintiff without contributory negli-
gence on his part, has suffered injury to his person or property." I
The objective theory of negligence had been adopted and the
CC reasonably prudent man" had been invented. By and large
both in England and the United States there was recognition of
the policy of making a negligent person liable for harm result-
ing from his activities and of not imposing liability for unintended
physical results where neither he nor someone acting for him
had fallen below the standard of careful conduct. Flctcher v.
Rylands,2 with its tendency towards the creation of liability irre-
spective of negligence, had gained little headway in the United
States. The doctrine of contributory negligence with its con-
fusing "last clear chance" modification had become definitely
established. But there were some anomalies and a great deal of
uncertainty as to the limits of liability for negligent conduct.
There was and is the unsolved difficulty resulting from the com-
mon-law viewpoint that one is liable only if he harms another
and is not liable in failing to confer a benefit upon another, the
difficulty of distinction being accentuated by a series of cases
distinguishing between" nonfeasance" and" misfeasance." This
becomes crucial in cases which involve the undertaking of an
obligation by the defendant as a contracting party or as a servant,
and a failure by him to perform where the failure results in harm
to third persons. It is in this field that we find the frequent
use of the word" privity," which is a useful word in some portions
of the law but not in the law of torts. Secondly, there was the
profound confusion centering upon situations in which the courts
found it necessary to use the language of legal causation, that is,
situations in which the defendant had been guilty of fault and
the problem was as to the limits of his liability. All were agreed
that even the most faulty person was not responsible for all the
consequences of his conduct, but although decisions could be
fairly well harmonized, there was no general agreement as to the
1 x Q. B. D. S03 (1883). 2 L. R. 3 H. L. 33o (xSGS).
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formulae to be used. There was, however, general agreement that
a negligent person should be liable for a particular harm only
if it was a "natural and proximate" or "direct" result, and in
determining this, the fact that a number of human acts intervened
between the negligence and the catastrophe was thought to be
important. The third difficulty arose from the fact that the com-
mon law gave greater protection against physical harm to a per-
son and to his things and against harm to his reputation than
it gave against harm to his economic security generally. Thus
one who negligently harmed another's horse or, even without
negligence, damaged another's reputation was liable, while one
who by negligent misrepresentation caused another to give credit
to a third person who thereby suffered loss, was under no liability.
Cardozo's contribution to the law of torts lay principally in clarify-
ing the general subject of negligence and in extending the liability
for negligently causing pecuniary loss.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company
His first great opinion was rendered in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Company.' The plaintiff was injured by the collapse of
a defective wheel on an automobile which he had purchased from
a retail dealer. The defendant had manufactured the car but
had purchased the wheel from another manufacturer and had
been negligent in failing to ascertain the defect. Aside from prece-
dent, it would seem fairly clear that under the ordinary principles
of negligence, more fully discussed later, the defendant should be
liable since a defective wheel on an automobile is obviously a
source of danger. A priori, the fact that the identity of the per-
sons likely to be hurt could not be known would seem to be
immaterial.
The difficulties related back to 1842 when, in the case of Winter-
bottom v. Wright," the Court of the Exchequer held that a person
who had contracted to supply mail coaches for the Postmaster
General and to keep them in repair was not liable to a driver hurt
when one of them collapsed, although the plaintiff averred in
his declaration that the defendant had so negligently disregarded
3 217 N. Y. 382, ixn N. E. ioo (1916). 4 1o M. & W. 1o9 (Ex. 1842).
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his contract that the coach was dangerous because of latent de-
fects. Members of the court could see no relation between the
defendant's duty to the Postmaster General and his liability to
the injured driver. "Privity" was absent. There was a mere
failure to perform a duty to the Postmaster General. A breach
of contract with one could not be made the basis of an action
of tort against another. Furthermore, an infinity of actions might
follow.
This case was followed by a long train of cases applying and to
some extent limiting the doctrine. In New York the courts had
refused to apply the rule to the situation where one not the im-
mediate purchaser had been poisoned by using belladonna from
a bottle which the defendant had erroneously labeled extract of
dandelion.' Nevertheless, the court accepted the reasoning of
Winterbottom v. Wright, distinguishing it by the fact that the
defendant was a dealer in things " imminently dangerous to life"
and had affixed a false label. This and other decisions continued
to reiterate the rule of nonliability, making only somewhat narrow
exceptions to it. The results of the American authorities were
perhaps best summed up by Sanborn, J., in Huset v. Case Thresh-
ing Machine Company.' He stated that a manufacturer is not
liable for harm caused by an article put on the market in such
form as to be dangerous to third persons, except where it is im-
minently dangerous to life or health and is intended to "preserve,
destroy, or affect human life" (in practice limited to foods and
explosives), or where there is " privity" between the parties, as
between the possessor of land and an invitee upon his premises,
or finally where the defendant actually knew of the defect. With
the manufacturer cases should be classed the contractor cases,
that is, those in which a contractor negligently builds a structure
which, after being taken over by the owner of the premises, causes
harm to a third person by its collapse or otherwise. Here, again,
the same technique was employed and the negligent contractor ex-
culpated from liability because, using the language of causation,
the possession of the owner had intervened between the negligent
Thomas v. Wimchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852).
1 i2o Fed. S65 (C. C. A. Sth, 19o3).
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act and the harm. It is to be noted that in all of these cases not
within the narrow exceptions, the injured person normally would
have no redress, since the duty of examination for defects by the
retail dealer in chattels and by the owner of a building could be
satisfied by a comparatively casual inspection.
That the results of the cases were both unjust and out of line
with negligence principles seems obvious now. Writers had fre-
quently called attention to the anachronism, but a great majority
of courts accepted it. It is true that the New York courts had
gone somewhat further than other courts, but the principle that
liability should be based upon the existence of a substantial chance
of harm and not upon the kind of commodity which had been
put into circulation had not been accepted. In the Buick case,
speaking for a court which granted recovery, Cardozo exposed
the fallacy of the limitations.
"If the nature of the thing is such that it is reasonably certain
to place life and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then
a thing of danger." Knowledge that the danger will be shared
by others than the buyer "may often be inferred from the nature
of the transaction." " In such circumstances, the presence of a
known danger, attendant upon a known use, makes vigilance a
duty." " Beyond all question, the nature of an automobile gives
warning of probable danger if its construction is defective." "It
was as much a thing of danger as a defective engine for a railroad.
The defendant knew the danger. It knew also that the car would
be used by persons other than the buyer. This was apparent
from its size; there were seats for three persons. It was apparent
also from the fact that the buyer was a dealer in cars, who bought
to resell." "The dealer was indeed the one person of whom it
might be said with some approach to certainty that by him the
car would not be used. Yet the defendant would have us say that
he was the one person whom it was under a legal duty to protect."
Especially Bohlen in a series of articles entitled, The Basis of Affirtnath,
Obligations in the Law of Tort (9o5) 53 U. OF PA. L. REV. 209, 273, 337, upon
which Cardozo drew in the Buick case. It was characteristic of Cardozo to give
more weight than do most judges to opinions not expressed in books with stiff
covers. Jeremiah Smith in the classroom anticipated the Buick decision by at least
fifteen years.
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"Subtle distinctions are drawn by the defendant between things
inherently dangerous and things imminently dangerous, but the
case does not turn upon these verbal niceties. If danger was to
be expected as reasonably certain, there was a duty of vigilance,
and this whether you call the danger inherent or imminent."
Cardozo's logic, which could not be refuted, and the prestige
of the New York court succeeded where professorial criticism
had been ineffective. It would not be true to state that the case
has been universally followed. Some of the American courts have
not been willing to change their habits of thought, or at least of
decision, and in the cognate situation where a flimsy structure
negligently erected by a contractor has caused harm to a third
person after its acceptance by the owner, the change has been
slow.8 But there is little doubt of the ultimate complete accept-
ance of Cardozo's viewpoint. Winterbottom v. Wright has been
discredited in the land of its birth ' and apparently without the
prophesied distressing consequences. The questions which Car-
dozo with characteristic caution, or perhaps to gain acceptance
by the court of his opinion, excluded from the decision-
whether the liability of a manufacturer would extend to harm to
chattels; o whether the maker of a defective component part sup-
plied to a manufacturer would be liable to the ultimate user I-
have been resolved by subsequent decisions in favor of liability.
It is probable that the next generation of law students will be led
to look upon Winterbottom v. Wright and its immediate successors
only as an interesting illustration of judicial frailty, or if they
favor the economic interpretation of judicial opinion, as an ex-
ample of temporary protective judicial legislation given the manu-
facturers until they became sufficiently strong as a group to pay
for the consequences of their employees' mistakes.
s Ford v. Sturgis, 14 F.(2d) 253 (App. D. C. 1926). A change of attitude is indi-
cated in Griffith v. Atlantic Refining Co., 305 Pa. 386, 157 At. 791 (x931).
9 A'Alister v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562, reviewed by Pollock in (1933) 49
L. Q. REv. 22; Grant v. Australian Knitting Mfills, [X936) A. C. 85.
10 Genesee County Patrons Fire Relief Ass'n v. L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 263
N. Y. 463, 189 N. E. 551 (1934) (harm to a barn).
"1 Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N. Y. 292, 1S N. E. 576 (1932).
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The Wagner Case
Wagner v. International Railway Company 11 involves sub-
stantially the same principle as the Buick case but has its own
difficulties. The plaintiff and his cousin were on one of the de-
fendant's interurban cars when the cousin was thrown from it by
the defendant's negligent act. The train was stopped and the
plaintiff, going through the darkness to search for his cousin, fell
and was injured.
That the defendant was negligent and that the negligence re-
sulted in harm was clear, but there was difficulty as to precedents.
And the case also presented the further problem of deciding
whether the defendant could reasonably have anticipated harm to
a rescuer. Previous decisions were far from conclusive. Liability
had been imposed in cases in which a person observing another
about to be harmed by the defendant's negligence had intervened
at the expense of harm to himself.13 These, however, differed
from the Wagner case in which the defendant's act had been done
before the plaintiff went to the rescue, and the plaintiff was not
acting "instinctively," apparently an important consideration in
other cases where recovery had been allowed. There were also
cases where a person had been injured in protecting himself or
his property from the effect of a negligent act of the defendant.
Here, however, the defendant could have anticipated harm to the
plaintiff, and the doctrine of avoidable consequences, by which
the owner could recover for harm to his things only if he made
reasonable efforts to prevent the harm, would seem to make it
clear that he was entitled to recovery. However, some courts had
refused recovery even in this case,14 and in other cases where the
plaintiff was a stranger attempting to rescue endangered property
of third persons recovery had been more widely denied."'
12 232 N. Y. 176, 133 N. E. 437 (1921).
13 E.g., Eckert v. Long Island R. R., 43 N. Y. 5o2 (1871).
14 Seale v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 65 Tex. 274 (i886); Crowley v. West End,
149 Ala. 613, 43 So. 359 (I9O7). Assumption of risk has been frequently used a-q
a bar to recovery, as in Cutler v. United Dairies, Ltd., [1933] 2 K. B. 297.
15 Cook v. Johnston, 58 Mich. 437, 25 N. W. 388 (8S5); Eversole v. Wabash
R. R., 249 Mo. 523,155 S. V. 419 (1913).
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The decision in the Wagner case, where recovery was allowed,
was therefore opposed in principle to many existing decisions and
went further than any case had previously gone. Again, how-
ever, Cardozo's logic, even when divorced from the persuasive
appeal contained in the phrase "danger invites rescue," seems
inescapable. It places responsibility for the consequences of a
choice made by the plaintiff upon the one who put him in the
dilemma of choosing between safety for himself or aid to a friend.
The fact that the plaintiff had an opportunity to consider the al-
ternatives would seem to have no bearing upon liability, provided
the plaintiff acted rationally. Witness the numerous cases in
which the plaintiff comes to harm in an effort to escape a greater
harm threatened by the acts of the defendant. The reasoning
which gives one a privilege to intervene to defend a third person
from an attack is also applicable.
The importance of this case and of the Buick case is that they
focus attention upon the risk of harm and not upon the manner
by which it is caused or the number of events intervening between
the defendant's act and the catastrophe. The older phrases which
were used to describe the situations and to delimit liability are
abandoned in favor of the realistic viewpoint by which anticipa-
tion of harm and not the proximity in point of space or time or
the number of intervening events is of sole importance. The
theory that for some undefined reason the intervening acts of
human beings may " insulate" the defendant's negligence from
its consequences becomes no longer tenable. The sole question
is whether there is sufficient risk.
The Palsgraf Case
The decision in the Palsgraf case 2' was a natural development
of the theory underlying the two preceding cases, the implications
of which were not perhaps fully perceived by the profession. The
very fact that in the Palsgraf case judgment was given for the
defendant accentuates rather than throws doubt upon the under-
lying theorem of the three cases, which is that risk not merely
16 Palsgraf v. Long Island P. R, 248 N. Y. 339, x62 N. E. 99 (z928).
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creates the existence of liability but defines its limits both with
reference to the person injured and to the harm.
In this case the plaintiff, a woman, was sitting in a railroad
station some distance from the track. Two of the train guards,
in assisting a passenger to reach the platform of the already
moving train, clumsily knocked from his arms a small package,
which, although its appearance did not so indicate, contained
fireworks. The package fell beneath the wheels of the train and
an explosion resulted, causing scales near which the plaintiff was
standing to be thrown against her. On a finding by the jury
that the guards were negligent, judgment for the plaintiff was
entered both in the trial term and in the Appellate Division. The
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment by a four to three de-
cision.
Cardozo, speaking for the majority, reasoned that the plaintiff
might "claim to be protected against unintentional invasion by
conduct involving in the thought of reasonable men an unrea-
sonable hazard that such invasion would ensue "but" if no hazard
was apparent to the eye of ordinary vigilance, an act innocent
and harmless, at least to outward seeming with reference to her,
did not take to itself the quality of a tort because it happened
to be a wrong, though apparently not one involving the risk of
bodily insecurity, with reference to someone else." "Wrong to
another cannot be the basis of the plaintiff's claim and even less a
wrong to a mere property interest." "Negligence like risk is thus
a term of relation." "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines
the duty to be obeyed and risk imports relation." "Negligence
in the abstract apart from things related is surely not a tort."
"Affront to personality is still the keynote of the wrong." "The
victim does not sue derivatively or by right of subrogation to vin-
dicate an interest invaded in the person of another." "-e sues
for breach of a duty owing to himself. The law of causation re-
mote or proximate is thus foreign to the case." Andrews, on the
other hand, speaking for the dissent, said that "it is the act itself,
not the intent of the actor that is important "; that "where there
is the unreasonable act and some right that may be affected, there
is negligence "; that this is "a wrong not only to those who hap-
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pen to be within the radius of danger but to all who might have
been there." Yet "the danger must be so connected with the
negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause
of the former." One must be "a substantial factor in producing
the other." There must be "a direct connection between them
without too many intervening causes, a natural and continuous
sequence between cause and effect." "It is all a question of
expediency. There are no fixed rules to govern our judgment."
"There is in truth little to guide us other than common sense."
The two opinions make the issues dear. They crystallize
the arguments which have surrounded such situations until the sub-
ject of legal cause as an element in liability for negligence has be-
come a stench in the nostrils of Law Review editors, the arguments
which have caused some judges, hopeless of understanding them
and with characteristic faith in the ability of the jury to un-
tangle that which the judge cannot, to leave the whole matter
to the jury without further statement than that a negligent
defendant is liable if he was the legal cause of the harm. The
result sought by Cardozo, Andrews, and all the others is a formula
which with a fair degree of definiteness will mark the boundary
between liability and nonliability and be consistent with our
sense of justice as this has been developed in imposing liability
in negligence cases."7 Before appraising the utility of the two
opinions for this purpose, it may be well to indicate the three
patterns into which fall negligence cases involving both the ex-
istence and the extent of liability.
First, where the defendant's act is one of a number of cooper-
ating causes and where the harm would have happened irrespec-
tive of the defendant's act. This is illustrated where there are
two fires, each of which is negligently started and which, com-
bining, burn the plaintiff's house which would have been burned
by either of the fires; or where the plaintiff's house is washed away
by a flood caused either by the breaking of a number of negli-
137 Note, however, that Cardozo's test, by throwing the problem into one of a
relational duty of care owed to the plaintiff, may give the court greater control of
the case than does Andrews' view *hich, when the court finds that there was
a duty to exercise care owed to some person, leaves to the jury the question whether
the breach of such duty was a legal cause of harm to the plaintiff.
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gently constructed dams or by a combination of a poor dam and
an extraordinary and unexpectable flood. In all such cases ad-
mittedly the defendant's act is not a cause of the result, using
cause in the sense of necessary antecedent. Just as obviously,
however, if there are a number of negligent acts any one of which
would have caused the harm, unless all of the defendants are to
escape liability, we must make each responsible, at least if one
of the acts does not greatly predominate over the others. Thus,
for instance, where a large group of rioters harms the plaintiff's
house, we think it fair to impose liability for the entire harm upon
each member of the group, even though the individual contribu-
tion to the riot is comparatively small. On the other hand, where
a person is wounded coincidently by two persons acting sepa-
rately, one of whom gives him a mortal wound, while the other
causes only a scratch, we would think it unfair to hold the latter
liable for a death resulting from loss of blood. It is in this type
of situation that it is useful to say that the defendant is not liable
unless his act is an appreciable or substantial factor; that is,
unless, considering all the events and the relation between his
act and the other acts cooperating in producing the result, we
feel that his act had a substantial effect. Obviously we do not
need the use of the words "proximate" or "direct" in connec-
tion with such cases; the problem of liability does not depend
upon the succession of events. This situation is not involved in
the Palsgraf case since there the only negligent acts done were by
the defendant's servants and since their acts were important factual
causes, however we may use that word.
The second group of cases involves only the question Qf dam-
ages. It is assumed in these cases that the defendant is a tort-
feasor with respect to the plaintiff and the question is as to the
extent of the harm for which he is liable. The type case is that
where one negligently strikes another causing him immediate seri-
ous harm, as a result of which he is taken to a hospital and sub-
sequently suffers further harm or dies because of intervening negli-
gence or extraneous events, such as the burning of the hospital.
With reference to this type of situation, the problem may be as
to liability for the harm immediately ensuing upon the negligent
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act or for the harm which subsequently develops. As to the
first, it accords with our general sense of justice that the tortfeasor
should be liable irrespective of the unexpectedness of such harm.
Thus where the defendant has negligently struck a person whose
skull is so fragile that it is broken by the comparatively slight
blow, all courts are agreed that the defendant is liable for the
wholly unexpected breaking. This is true not only with reference
to physical harm but also other forms of harm. If a person were
negligently to incapacitate another who has a yearly earning
capacity of a hundred thousand dollars, there is liability for the
resulting loss though so great a loss could not have been antici-
pated. It may be that this is a possible explanation for the re-
action of the King's Bench in its famous but doubtful decision of
the Polemis case, in which the defendant whose workman negli-
gently dropped a plank into the hold of a ship filled with gasoline
vapor was made liable for the destruction of the ship resulting
from the ensuing explosion.' s In this, as in other cases, the courts
are agreed that the negligent person takes his victims as they
are. With respect to harms resulting subsequently, as in the death
from a hospital fire, the approach is similar to that used where the
question is whether there is any liability and not its extent. Thus
to use the method used by Cardozo, the defendant is liable for
subsequent events which, after the tort has matured by impact,
appear to be within the risk. To use the approach of Andrews,
the defendant is liable for those subsequent events of which the
impact is the proximate and natural or direct cause.
The third group of cases is that in which the Palsgraf case, the
Buick case and the Wagner case fall and in which the defendant's
negligence is a sine qua non or necessary antecedent of the acci-
dent, but in which the question still remains whether the defend-
ant has committed a tort to the plaintiff.
There are perhaps three factors which are to be considered in
determining whether the approach of Cardozo or that of Andrews
is to be preferred in this type of situation.
3. Which is the more consistent with our sense of justice in the
particular case? Personally, I would find it hard to answer this
3s In re Polemis, Furness, Withy & Co., Ltd., [I921] 3 K. B. 56o.
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question. An innocent person has been hurt; some one must bear
the loss. The defendant's employee was negligent, although only
slightly. The fact that neither he nor his innocent employer had
reason to believe that a momentary clumsiness might lead to great
liability is not of itself sufficient to deny it. The law is not
squeamish about imposing liability upon even innocent wrong-
doers, as the defamation and conversion cases show; only by the
unlawful act of the jury can damages be minimized when fault is
slight or absent. On the other hand, it is universally agreed that
the fact that a loss has resulted from the defendant's negligent
conduct is not enough to impose liability. A momentary lapse
does not transform the defendant into a man whom we wish to
punish. He is not disentitled to take advantage of rules which
may limit his liability.
2. Which view is more consistent with the underlying theory
of negligence? On the existing cases, this issue seems clear. Even
intentionally bad acts do not necessarily result in liability to the
actor for harm thereby caused. One who, while carefully driving
an automobile with which he is kidnapping a child, runs over and
kills a pedestrian is not civilly liable for the death, even though
he may be guilty of murder. In the Palsgraf case, the defendant's
act was wrongful only because it created a risk - that is, an un-
reasonable risk - of harm to the package. Prima facie at least,
the reasons for creating liability should limit it. In fact, what-
ever expressions have been used to define the limits of liability
in this type of case, expectability has always been in the back-
ground. Rules have frequently cut liability below this point.
Thus in some states, New York included, there is no liability for
negligently causing a mental disturbance which later, through
internal causes, leads to physical harm." The New York fire
19 The position of the New York court was made somewhat doubtful by an
opinion announcing a decision for the plaintiff who fainted upon the sidewalk im-
mediately after a slight impact with her car, the fall causing injury. Comstock
v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (93). The New York Law Revision
Commission in 1936 submitted a draft of a statute providing that "recovery shall
not be denied merely because such bodily injury or wrongful.death was brought
about through fright or shock without physical contact or impact." N. Y. L,
REvisroN Comm. REP. (1936) 377. The legislature rejected the recommendation.
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rules, and the rule in the waterworks cases (discussed below), are
further illustrations of this. However, except as to consequences
immediately following the tortious impact, seldom have the courts
extended liability beyond the field in which there is an appreci-
able risk of harm. Interpretation of the innumerable statutes fix-
ing a standard of care, such as those defining the rules of the
road, is such that an injured person is protected only if it is found
that the statute makers intended to protect a person in his class
against a statutory violation, and then only if the harm he suffered
is within the risk which the statute was intended to minimize.
Likewise the owner of a dog, known to be vicious, who would be
liable without fault if it should bite a person after escaping, is
not (apart from statute) liable to a person whom the dog clumsily
knocks down, since the risk created by the dog was only that of
being bitten. -0 I would assume that a court which would impose
liability for harm resulting from an unexplained explosion of a
large quantity of explosives, -' would not hold liable the possessor
of a pile of boxed explosives if, without his negligence, the boxes
were to fall upon and crush the foot of a privileged visitor igno-
rant of the danger inherent in the pile. The risk is one of explosion
and not of crushing.
In the modern negligence cases, the fact that the harm is di-
rectly caused by an intervening act of a stranger induced by the
defendant's negligent conduct prevents the imposition of liability
upon the first wrongdoer only if the type of intervention was not
within the risk. Thus if the defendant were to leave open a bulk-
head adjacent to a slippery sidewalk and a crowd of rowdies so
jostled the plaintiff that he fell into the bulkhead, the defendant
would be liable for the harm; if, however, the plaintiff were pushed
in by an enemy, there would be no liability."- The risk was that a
20 Koetting v. Conroy, 223 Wis. 550, 27o N. AV. 625 (x936). In Scribner v.
Kelley, 38 Barb. 14 (N. Y. 1862), where the plaintiff's horse was frightened by
the defendant's elephant which was being led on the turnpike, the court said that
the horse was not frightened by the elephant qua elephant, but only as a large
animate object. Quaere.
21 Exner v. Sherman Power Const. Co., 54 F.(-d) 5xo (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
22 Miller v. Bahmmuller, 124 App. Div. 558, io8 N. Y. Supp. 924 (xst Dep't
:908).
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traveler might slip in or be inadvertently pushed in, and not that
he might be thrown in. On the other hand, one who negligently
knocks over a wagon filled with goods would be liable to the owner
for losses caused by thievery which the collision made expectable."
These results represent the normal reaction of courts to the
various situations where the basic wrong is the creation of an un-
reasonable risk. Cardozo rationalizes the results, making them
consistent with the fundamental conception of negligence. An-
drews, as do all the philosophic proponents of the legal cause ap-
proach, rationalizes the results only by going back to the elemen-
tary basis of all proper legal decisions, by stating that the test is
whether the result found by the court accords with our sense of
justice. If we are to have the Chancellor's foot as a unit of meas-
urement, we may reasonably expect the Chancellor to have feet of
normal size; the result reached by Andrews is contrary to the
great weight of American decisions, as I understand them.
3. The final question is which of the two approaches can be
more easily applied. If we accept the Andrews opinion at its face
value there can be little said in favor of its ease of application. It
is difficult to apply a rule which is based upon " a rough sense of
justice "; which "arbitrarily declines to trace a series of events
beyond a certain point "; which is based upon "practical poli-
tics "; which has "no fixed rule to govern our judgment "; which
gives "little to guide us other than common sense " or, if there
are guides, a rule by which the answer depends upon whether there
was "a natural and continuous sequence between cause and
effect." We certainly do not desire arbitrariness, and the term
"practical politics" as applied to negligence has no very definite
connotation. No reason is obvious, and none is given, why inter-
vening events, time or space should play a part, aside from their
expectability. One who leaves percussion caps where he should
know a child will find them should not be and is not relieved from
liability for harm where the child who finds them places them with
his treasures carefully concealed from adult eyes and six months
later trades them to another child in another city who, in playing
with them, causes an explosion, harming whom you will. Even
23 Brower v. New York C. & H. R. R. R., 91 N. J. L. 19o, xo3 Atl. 66 (1918).
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Andrews invokes expectability in the Palsgraf case by asking
what might be expected from the dropping of a package, but in
order to make the result expectable, he begins his "chain of
events" or his "direct sequence" by assuming an explosion as
the beginning of the series. Those using the test of directness are
merely playing with a metaphor; if directness is meant to connote
the comparative absence of external forces not set in motion by
the defendant, it is not responsive to the decisions either as a test
of inclusion or exclusion. The phrases "natural and continuous
sequence" and undeftected " stream of events" mean nothing
except so far as they have reference to expectability by persons
who know some of the facts but not all of them, -that is, the
reasonably prudent and intelligent person at the time and place -
and this of course brings us back to risk. The connection between
the act of the person who fails to insert a cotter pin in the mecha-
nism of an automobile and the harm to a guest in the car six
months later in another part of the country (facts corresponding
to the Buick case), is direct only in the sense that the result is
within the risk created by the failure. If we go beyond Andrews
and use other well-known phrases and similes, we fare no better.
Has the defendant's force been continuously active? In this use
of the word, active is again but a metaphor, unless by "active"
we mean pregnant with danger. Was the defendant's act a condi-
tion rather than the cause? This phrase can be interpreted only
if we know what distinguishes condition from cause, or in other
words, if we have already answered the problem. For many years
chains and nets were supposed to have something to do with lia-
bility and although Andrews preferred not to use them, I suggest
that by their use the situation is described no more inaccurately,
if less vividly, than by the phrases which have displaced them in
the favor of the modern Andrews School.
In place of word paintings and purported reasons, Cardozo in
the three opinions here reviewed substituted" risk," a word which
has a meaning, not merely to the legal student, trained in the use
of fictions, but also to the jurors to whom, in most cases, the de-
cisions will be entrusted. If it is complained that "risk" is a
word of no definite import, it may be answered that at least it is
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more descriptive than the other phrases used, which in this type
of case at least, always resolve themselves ultimately into rules
dealing with expectability. If it is observed that the risk concep-
tion limits liability in situations like the Palsgraf case, it may be
answered that it also widens it as in the Buick case, and that in
both cases it makes the penalty fit the offense of the negligent
person. It is consistent with this approach to carry liability
further when the risk is to many and not merely to a few, a result
which would be illogical were we relying merely upon "an un-
broken stream of events" to carry the plaintiff to his destination
of recovery.
It is difficult to forecast the ultimate effect of the Palsgraf de-
cision. In Smith v. London & Southwestern Railway, Brett,
M. R., in the Court of Exchequer," made the suggestion that there
should be no liability except where there has been negligence to
the plaintiff. This idea was definitely rejected by the Court of the
Exchequer Chamber.2 Much later the point of view was devel-
oped and fully expounded by Bingham."6 Judge Peaslee, in deny-
ing recovery for the death of an unseen trespasser in an accident
which was negligent as to others, applied the principle with char-
acteristic clarity and force.27  Cardozo's opinion has received
powerful support from the Second Circuit Court of Appeals."
But it is difficult for the courts and lawyers to avoid using familiar
phraseology, and apparently the older terms have much charm for
the profession. Text writers likewise fear to depart from long
accepted usage. Perhaps to provide a transition period in which
the courts might use either approach, the Restatement of Torts,
first adopting to the full the theory of risk, " at a later stage recants
and presents aconfusing series of "superseding causes," 11 which
24 L. R. 5 C. P. 98 (1870).
25 L. R. 6 C. P. 14 (87o).
26 Legal Cause at Common Law (i9o9) 9 CoL. L. REv. 6, X36, 194.
27 Garland v. Boston & M. R. R., 76 N. H. 556, 86 Atl. 141 (X913).
28 Sinram v. Pennsylvania R. R., 61 F.(2d) 767 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). Strong sup-
port is also given by Wickhem's opinion in Waube v. Warrington, 26 Wis. 6o3, 258
N. W. 497 (x933).
2D § 281.
30 §§ 44o-42. In fairness, I should point out that the general statement of legal
cause in § 431, I regard as accurate. "The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause
of harm to another if (a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the
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may cut off liability. The courts, like the Rcstatemcnt, have fre-
quently tried to ride two horses, but I have faith that the sim-
plicity, logic, and justice of the approach made prominent by
Cardozo will ultimately prevail.
The Moch Case
After the Biick, Wagner and Palsgraf cases, Mock v. Rens-
selaer Water Company 3 is an anticlimax, but discussion of it is
necessary to complete the picture. Cardozo, writing for a unani-
mous court on a motion to dismiss in the nature of a demurrer,
denied recovery against a waterworks company which, after notice
ofthe existence of a fire, had failed to supply to the street mains
the pressure which it had contracted with the city to supply. As
a result, the plaintiff's building was destroyed. The court disre-
garded, as grounds for liability, the theories that there was a
contract for the benefit of the plaintiff, and that the defendant
had committed a breach of statutory duty. It further denied that
there was the basis of a tort action, even though it were assumed
that the defendant had been negligent in failing to maintain water
pressure.
That the result of the Mock case probably is sound must be
admitted, not merely because of the failure of the plaintiff to
allege negligence in the performance of the contract, but also be-
cause the overwhelming weight of authority in this country has
denied liability under similar conditions. The court might have
dealt with it as a special waterworks situation as it had dealt with
the spread of fire." It might have placed the result wholly upon
harm, and (b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because
of the manner in which his negligence has resulted in the harm." This provides
for situations in which it is necessary to use the idea of substantial factor and also
for the exceptional cases where there is a liability-limiting rule, as is true in New
York with reference to the spread of fire, and harm resulting from mental shocl:
without impact. The sections dealing with superseding cause, however, are illusory;
no illustration of a superseding cause is given which would not come within an
exposition of the limits of undue risk to the injured person.
31 247 N. Y. 16o, 169 N. E. 896 (1928).
32 Cardozo did not dissent when the court accepted as settled the idiosyncratic
but long-existing New York rule by which the liability for spread of fire is limited
to harm to adjacent land except where the fire leaps an intervening street or vacant
spot. See Homac Corp. v. Sun Oil Co., 258 N. Y. 462, xSo N. E. 172 (1932).
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the assumed ground of public policy that the burden which would
be placed upon water companies by allowing recovery would be
too great. Had Cardozo said that the court was coerced by an
almost unanimous line of liability-denying decisions, not only in
New York but elsewhere, one would have little heart for disagree-
ment with the judgment of a court which has not been too insistent
upon adherence to stare decisis in tort cases. The fact that the
previous cases denying recovery had been largely based upon the
failure by the courts to recognize that the situation had a tort and
not a contract base would not necessarily be sufficient to require
a court to depart from settled authority in the absence of a strong
feeling that the older line of cases created an obvious injustice.
However, instead of pursuing his accustomed method of fac-
ing the realities, Cardozo speaks of the failure of the water com-
pany as if it were merely a failure to confer a benefit upon the
injured householder, and in denying liability relies upon the recog-
nized principle that one is under no duty to confer a benefit upon
another. Of course, the plaintiff did not complain of the failure
to receive a benefit. His real ground was that, because of reliance
upon the undertaking of the water company to maintain an ade-
quate pressure at the hydrants, the city had failed to make other
provision for the protection of its citizens, and the plaintiff,
among others, being lulled into a false sense of security, had failed
individually to take measures to protect his property. In sub-
stance, the situation does not differ from that where a train cuts a
fire hose or blocks a street, so that the fire department cannot
extinguish a fire. In both cases the defendant has prevented a
third person from rendering assistance. Where the act is after
the beginning of the fire, there is an immediacy of need which
does not exist in the waterworks situation, yet since it is well
known that fires occur from time to time in any town large enough
to afford waterworks, there would seem to be such a substantial
risk of harm to the group of which the plaintiff is one as would
make such cases directly in point. The risk to the individual
plaintiff is less, but the chance of harm to any one of a large
number is great. Furthermore, in the Mock case, it was alleged
that the defendant had failed to keep up the pressure after know-
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ing of the fire. It had been held before the Mock case, as it has
been held since, that the negligent breaking of a water main may
be the basis of a cause of action in favor of a householder who
had been thereby deprived of the assistance of the fire department
in quenching a fire."s Analogous are the cases where a railroad
has undertaken more than its legal duty in supplying at a railroad
crossing a watchman upon whose presence travelers frequently
using the crossing have relied,14 and those where an agent in
charge of a building has failed to keep it in repair, as a result of
which a third person is injured. In these cases where the wrong
consists of a failure to act, the older viewpoint was that since there
is mere "nonfeasance" and no direct obligation to the injured
person, there can be no liability to him. The fallacy of this older
point of view has been today generally exploded, and the Mock
case furnished a suitable opportunity for disposing of some of
the earlier cases in which the New York courts bad been reaction-
ary rather than forward-looking."5
Although Cardozo cites MacPlerson v. Buick and by implication
his criticism of Winterbottom v. Wright, his language is not dis-
similar to that of Lord Abinger in the latter case. Both judges
feared that an infinity of actions might follow and that "the as-
sumption of one relation will mean the involuntary assumption
of a series of new relations inescapably hooked together." Of
course, the fear that the failure to perform a contract with another
will necessarily result in liability to a third person harmed by its
breach is wholly unfounded. Had the court found it desirable to
impose liability upon the waterworks company, we may imagine
that Cardozo's language would have been substantially similar to
that in MacPherson v. Buick. Deciding as the court did, however,
the difference in the state of the authorities and the possible dif-
ference in policy would have afforded a sufficient reason for a
difference in result.
3 See the cases cited in Gilbert v. New Mexico Construction Co, 39 N. M.
216, 44 P.(2d) 489 (1935).
34 Erie R. R. v. Stewart, 4o F.(2d) 855 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
35 See (zgr6) 1 So. L. Q. 16, where I briefly discusssed the whole matter, being
then, as now, perhaps overdesirous for symmetry.




From the standpoint of the market place, the most important
cases are those in which Cardozo dealt with misrepresentations.
The first great opinion here is that in Glanzer v. Shepard.30  A
bean merchant requested the defendants, public weighers, to weigh
beans which he had sold, make a return of the weight and furnish
the buyer with a copy. The defendants did as bidden, but care-
lessly certified the weight to be greater than that which in fact it
was. One copy of the return was sent to the seller and a duplicate
to the buyer, the plaintiff. On discovering the discrepancy, the
buyers, who had already paid on the basis of the false weight,
brought suit against the defendants to recover the amount of the
overpayment.
Were this a case involving physical harm, there would have
been no shadow of doubt as to defendant's liability." As it was,
however, Cardozo's opinion that liability should be imposed was
an innovation. The results of the decisions up to that time may
be thus summarized. A fraudulent statement by one of two bar-
gaining parties to the other, resulting in the diminution of the
other's assets, was the basis of an action of tort. Likewise, in many
states, particularly in land cases, the results, although not the
language, of the decisions created liability to the other party for
36 233 N. Y. 236, 135 N. E. 275 (1922).
37 The cases involving harm resulting from a negligent verbal misstatement of
fact are not numerous. However, there are innumerable situations where the basis
of liability is an implied representation of safety, as is indicated by the fact that
in them, an exposure of the facts would have prevented liability. In this group fall
cases involving the liability of a master to his servant or of a landowner to a bu4i-
ness guest for concealed dangers which the master or landowner would have dis-
covered by the use of due care. Likewise the liability of a manufacturer is based
on the fact that he has caused harm by negligently permitting to be placed in the
channels of trade a thing which has a deceptive appearance of innocuotisneos.
In MacKown v. Illinois Publishing and Printing Co., 289 I11. App. 59,6 N. E.(2d)
526 (1937), recovery was denied in an action against a newspaper by a reader who
was harmed in using an improper remedy negligently recommended by a staff writer.
The court, failing to recognize the distinction between physical harm and harm to
pecuniary interests, based its opinion upon the New York cases culminating in the
Ultramares decision.
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statements which were honestly made but which the speaker
should have known were either untrue or doubtful." In a few
states, the tort action took the place of an action for breach of
warranty and recovery was allowed irrespective of reason to know
of the falsity."s However, there was substantially no authority
for holding that an action would lie against one not a fiduciary
who by negligent misrepresentations had caused no more than
pecuniary loss to one not contracting with him. In the situations
most nearly analogous, that is, where an attorney or abstracter
had negligently made an abstract upon which a third person had
relied, the great weight of authority denied recovery. The denial
of liability was beginning to be broken down by inroads in special
types of cases, ordinarily through the common-law device of a
fiction. Thus an agent who had misrepresented his authority,
even without negligence, was subject to liability on the theory that
he had warranted his power to act; again, one against whom the
doctrine of estoppel could be employed was held liable for a loss
resulting even from his innocent and nonnegligent statements.
The prevailing rule that an attorney or abstracter who had negli-
gently prepared an abstract of title was liable only to his employer
had been invaded, in some states by using the undisclosed princi-
pal doctrine or the rule of Lawrence v. Fox, and in others even
without these subtleties. Again, attention had been called to the
anomalous distinction between liability for causing harm to per-
sons and things and the nonliability for causing loss to a pecuniary
interest.
The time was ripe for taking advanced ground and in Glanzer v.
Shepard this ground was taken by the use of every dialectic
weapon which could be brought to bear. The representation was
made directly to the plaintiff; the defendant acted "for the very
purpose of inducing action "; he was exercising a common calling
in which one must act carefully if at all, even though acting gratui-
38 Various forms of language are used to conceal the basis. A familiar form
is to state that "one who falsely asserts a material fact, susceptible of accurate
knowledge, to be true of his own knowledge is fraudulent." See Chatham Fur-
nace Co. v. Moffatt, 147 Mass. 403, is N. E. x68 (i888) ; Hadcock v. Ozmer, xS3
N. Y. 604, 47 N. E. 923 (1897); Cabot v. Christie, 42 VL 121 (1869).
39 Aldrich v. Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 17 N. W. 581 (igoS).
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tously; title searchers are liable if they deliver a certificate di-
rectly to the person who has to act upon it; the liability is based
not merely on careless words but on "the careless performance
of a service, the act of weighing "; the situation is not different in
principle from that in Lawrence v. Fox or that where the sender
of a telegram is treated as the agent of the recipient for the pur-
pose of allowing the recipient to sue for negligent transmission.
"The defendants, acting not casually nor as mere servants but
in the pursuit of an independent calling, weighed and certified at
the order of one with the very end and aim of shaping the conduct
of another. Diligence was owing not only to him who ordered,
but to him also who relied."
Much of Cardozo's argument can be minimized. There is not
here the frankness displayed in most of his other opinions. He
ignored the distinction which made the case an advance over those
which had gone before. Those exercising a public calling had
previously been made liable to those not employing them only for
physical harm, for example, surgeons employed by others than the
patients. Furthermore, the weigher was not engaged in a public
calling of the type to which special rules apply, if indeed his calling
was in any sense public. The abstracter cases which he cited
represented the minority view and most of them imposed liability
on contract grounds. That the error was made in weighing and
not in representation was obviously immaterial, nor does it appear
whether the error was in weighing or in recording the weight.
Nevertheless, it is a successful and powerful opinion. The cata-
loguing of the diverse situations in which recovery had been al-
lowed makes clear the fundamental principle and the futility of
widely diverse rules for situations essentially similar. The shal-
lowness of the various pretexts used by the courts to advance from
point to point is revealed. We are made to feel that although
minute and inconsequential differences are the materials upon
which the law grows, yet they can be disregarded when its growth
has been completed; that the exploratory lines of the sketch can
be erased when the design for the finished picture has been per-
ceived.
It is not until we come to the last sentences of the opinion that
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we receive warning that the recognition of a principle does not
involve its universal application. Principles by which liability is
created are frequently more easily discernible than the limits to
which equitably they should extend. Thus in this opinion Cardozo
stated the principle that there should be liability for the negligent
use of language involving no physical harm, but immediately
served notice that it might be of limited application and that cate-
gories which customary methods of decisions have created cannot
properly be completely ignored. Such categories are frequently
built upon subtle differences which feeling and not logic will re-
veal. Thus the ancient law of defamation with its absolute lia-
bility for the use of language even when not on its face de-
famatory, still has vitality in a world in which language, not
defamatory, ordinarily imposes no liability even when negligently
uttered. Only when habits of thought are substantially changed
is it time for a complete revolution.
The succeeding cases demonstrate the vulnerability of the gen-
eralization which might have been made from a hasty reading of
Glanzer v. Shepard. The following year the New York court de-
cided that a firm furnishing ticker service for brokerage offices
should not be liable for loss caused to a broker's customer who
had relied upon its erroneous and negligent report of a decision of
the Supreme Court. On demurrer, in a memorandum opinion, the
judgment of the Appellate Division was affirmed, the only clue to
the reasons being in a statement that the one furnishing ticker serv-
ice was in the same position as the publisher of a newspaper.40 In
the next case involving a similar issue,4 ' the court granted recovery
against a railroad which had contracted to store the goods of a
consignee and which in response to his request for information of
the location of the goods for insurance purposes negligently gave
erroneous information, with the result that he could not collect the
insurance upon the goods when they were burned. Andrews,
speaking for the court, explicitly denied the existence of broad
implications from the Glanzer case. After intimating that in the
ticker case recovery was defeated because the plaintiff had no
40 Jaillet v. Cashman, 235 N. Y. 5x, 139 N. E. 7z4 (1923).
41 International Products Co. v. Erie R. R., 244 N. Y. 33r, z55 N. E. 662 (1927).
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right to act on the belief that the defendant had used care in
spreading the report, and pointing out that the relations between
parties which will create a duty of care and liability for a failure
to exercise it cannot be precisely defined, he said: "We have con-
fined our decision to the precise issues before us." This would
seem to be the extreme of caution since, because of the bailor-
bailee relation in the case, the decision was no advance over pre-
existing law. This cautious language is, however, used as a basis
for denying recovery in a case 4. in which the court finds the de-
cisive ground for denying recovery to be the fact that the defend-
ant had no reason to believe that his erroneous statement would
cause the plaintiff to act in the way in which he did. There was
no advance made in the next case in the series " although recovery
was allowed. A trustee for an issue of bonds was made liable to
a bondholder purchasing the bonds on the strength of the defend-
ant's certificate that collateral had been deposited with him. The
relation of trustee and cestui que trust which existed between the
parties would have been a sufficient basis for recovery. Further,
the result could have been reached on authority by use of the
estoppel technique; that is, the court could have held that the
trustee was estopped to deny that he had the collateral and hence
would be dealt with as if he had it.
The Ultramares Case
In spite of the strait jacket into which the principal of liability
for loss caused by negligent language hhd been placed by the
preceding cases, when a divided Appellate Division decided
for the plaintiff in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche," there was
general approval. This case is significant both in the field of
negligence and in the field of fraud. The defendants, a firm of
public accountants, had been employed to prepare and certify a
balance sheet for a company. To finance its operation, this com-
pany required extensive credit and borrowed large sums of money
.42 Courteen Seed Co. v. Hong Kong and S. B. Corp., 245 N. Y. 377, z57 N. E,
272 (1927).
43 Doyle v. Chatham & Phoenix Nat. Bank, 253 N. Y. 369, 171 N. E. 574 (93o).
44 229 App. Div. 58r, 243 N. Y. Supp. 179 (ist Dcp't 193o), rev'd, 255 N. Y.
170, '74 N. E. 441 (I93i).
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from banks and money lenders. All this was known to the de-
fendants, who also knew that in the usual course of business the
balance sheet, when certified, would be exhibited to banks, credi-
tors, stockholders, purchasers and sellers, according to the needs
of the occasion, as the basis of financial dealings. To satisfy this
purpose, the defendants supplied thirty-two copies as counterpart
originals. The defendants did not know the persons to whom
these would be shown or the extent or number of the transactions
in which they were used; nor did they know of the existence of the
plaintiff who previously had dealt, in a small way, with the com-
pany. In reliance upon the certificate furnished by the defendants
and, it may be presumed, in view of the general reputation of the
company, the plaintiff advanced to it some $165,ooo. About nine
months thereafter, the company became insolvent. It then ap-
peared that the statement made by the defendants had erroneously
included as an asset a nonexistent item of some $90o,0oo, the lack
of which caused the company to be insolvent. Had the facts been
correctly certified by the defendants, the plaintiff would not have
made the loan.
The Appellate Division had found negligence but no fraud and
imposed liability upon the basis of the elements which in previous
cases had appeared to be important, that is, the knowledge that
the certificate would be shown to third persons who would rely
upon it, the reliance by the plaintiff in the precise way foreseen,
and the loss resulting thereafter. Finch, in dissenting, found that
the certificate was in such form that the plaintiff should not have
relied upon it and also that there was contributory negligence in
his failure to look at the collateral. Of more importance, to his
mind, were the facts that the certificate was not prepared for the
use of any definite class of persons and that the sum paid the de-
fendants for the accounting was so small in comparison with the
liability which might result that it would be unfair to make the
defendants responsible. The Court of Appeals found negligence
with no liability, but ordered a new trial upon the issue of fraud.
The opinion of Cardozo, in dealing with the question of the
defendant's liability for negligence, illustrates both his strength
and his weakness. His opinion is strong in its realistic approach
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and the persuasiveness with which the human problems involved
are dealt. He squarely faces the reasons for a difference in the
rules of liability for conduct causing physical harm and that which
results in merely pecuniary loss. He no longer relies on the dis-
tinction made in Glanzer v. Shepard between negligence in physi-
cal activity, which induces a mistake causing a misrepresentation,
and negligence merely in speaking. He focuses attention upon the
comparatively narrow limits within which recovery for fraud, a
greater offense than negligence, had been permitted. But above
all he stresses the practical effect of imposing liability. " If lia-
bility for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the fail-
ure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The
hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as
to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication
of a duty that exposes to these consequences." It is this possi-
bility of liability of unknown extent which distinguishes the Ultra-
mares case from that where beans were misweighed or misrepre-
sentations made as to the location of goods, since there the limit
of liability was the value of the chattels with reference to which
the statements were made. There is a closer analogy to the stock
ticker case where likewise the extent of liability, once its existence
was admitted, could not be foretold. In the one type of case, a
comparatively small premium will secure insurance; in the other,
since the upper limit of liability is indefinite, complete protec-
tion can probably not be obtained.
But Cardozo weakened his opinion by making distinctions
where there are no differences. Thus he says that in Glanzer v.
Shepard, the service rendered was primarily for the information
of a third person, whereas in the Ultramares case, the informa-
tion was primarily for the benefit of the corporation and not for
that of the lenders. It is reasonably obvious that the weight card
in the former case was for the benefit of the seller as well as for
the benefit of the buyer, and that in the latter case the duplicate
originals were intended for the benefit of third persons as well as
for the client. To distinguish the case between the railroad and
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the consignee, he says that there the defendant had peculiar op-
portunity for knowledge; certainly it was true in the Ultramarcs
case that the effectiveness of the accountant's statement was be-
cause his business was to acquire very intimate and thorough
knowledge. Both the consignee case and the case holding the trus-
tee liable to the bondholder could have been distinguished on
other grounds; but the unknowable extent of possible liability is
the most rational. Otherwise, if decision is to be made on prin-
ciple rather than on common-law technicalities, there should be
liability in all cases or in none. It is probable that fears expressed
for the solvency of the accounting profession, if liability were to
be imposed, were ill-founded. Whether or not we believe that the
Securities and Exchange Act is wise, it does not seem credible that
the liability imposed by that act upon "every accountant, en-
gineer or appraiser" who has been named as having prepared or
certified any part of the registration statement or report or valua-
tion used in connection with it will result in the insolvency of many
honest men.
The law of negligent misrepresentation which causes only pecu-
niary loss, with its separation from the law of negligence generally
and with its excrescence of estoppel by which there may be lia-
bility even without negligence, is confused and incoherent. The
Ultramares opinion, because of the manner of dealing with previ-
ous decisions, did little to lessen the confusion. Upon this branch
of the case I cannot but feel that Cardozo missed an opportunity
of clarification. Had he been content to point out that the sound
theory can never differ from good practice, and that practical
reasons require that the liability for causing merely pecuniary loss
should be more limited than the liability for causing physical
harm, he would have stilled some of the critics.
But perhaps this is being too captious. The decision itself can
be defended; certainly there is no way of proving the decision to
be wrong in effect. The greater liability would undoubtedly en-
tail greater expense for those obtaining certificates from reputable
lawyers and accountants or, in the alternative, drive them to a
financially irresponsible professional group. Moreover, it must
be borne in mind that the New York court had taken the lead in
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this field and that the courts of other states had shown little in-
clination to follow. In the absence of convincing evidence to the
contrary, it is rational to make the assumption that Cardozo
showed his usual judicial sense in deciding to leave to the legisla-
ture the responsibility of carrying to a greater extent the liability
for negligent misrepresentation causing only pecuniary loss.
While the Ultramares case is best known on account of its neg-
ligence problem, the holding of the court that if on a new trial it
should be found that the agent of the defendant knowingly mis-
represented the facts the defendant should be liable constitutes a
landmark in the law of fraud.
Cardozo's belief that by even slightly enlarging the boundaries
of liability for negligent misrepresentation the court would find
itself going further than other courts had gone in imposing liability
for intentional misrepresentation was well founded. Liability for
fraud although enlarged in other directions, had never been ex-
panded by the courts much beyond its original limitation in this
respect. By 193o, the privilege of one bargaining party to cheat
another had gradually been narrowed; the field of permissible
sellers' lies had been made smaller. Liability for a misrepresenta-
tion as to the speaker's state of mind, once denied in New York as
well as in other states, had become established. Promises and
prophecies had been recognized as containing elements of present
representations. There had been created a duty to speak when
silence would otherwise create an inference of fact contrary to the
truth, as in the case where purchases are made with knowledge of
hopeless insolvency. The field of liability for misrepresentation
of opinions, including statements of law, had been enlarged. In
most states it was no longer a defense that the plaintiff was a fool.
But, by and large, there had been no corresponding extension of
liability to third persons. It was thus possible for the Restate-
ment of Torts to state that one who knowingly makes a misstate-
ment to another is not liable to a third person for its repetition
although the maker "knows that its recipient may probably or
will to a substantial certainty repeat it to a third person for the
purpose of influencing his conduct in transactions with him," 45
45 § 533, comment b.
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and that, with narrow exceptions, one who makes a fraudulent
misrepresentation is liable "only to those persons to whom it is
made with the intent to cause them to act in reliance upon it and
to such persons only for the pecuniary harm suffered by them by
relying upon it in the transaction or type of transaction in which
the maker intended to influence their conduct." " I believe that
this represents the vanishing viewpoint of generations of judges
who looked upon actions of fraud with a suspicion engendered
perhaps by the prevalence in business of the ethics of the horse
trader or perhaps because of the ease with which the plaintiff
could manufacture evidence. But that such viewpoint still has
vitality cannot be doubted.
It is because of this background that the decision of the court
to allow recovery of damages by a stranger to the transaction
whose personality was unknown to the defendant and in whose
deception the defendant had no interest is of great importance.
This is especially true in view of the broad characterization of
fraud as including a situation where the specific fraud, as existing
evidence would indicate, involved little more than negligence.
The effect of holding that the jury might infer fraud from the fact
that the certificate had been given without more investigation than
that made by the defendant, on the ground that it constituted a
statement of the existence of facts as to which the certifier knew
that he had no knowledge, is largely to diminish, in practice, the
46 § 531. The statement in this section is, however, broader than that in some
of the earlier decisions which, in words at least, confined liability to those persons
to whom the misrepresentation was made for the purpose of deceiving them. If
there is a remnant of this view, the Ultramares case should end it.
47 See State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N. Y. io4, i5 N. E.(.d) 4x6 (1938),
where in reversing a judgment directed for an accountant by the Appellate Division,
Finch, J., says: "Accountants, however, may be liable to third parties, even where
there is lacking deliberate or active fraud. A representation certified as true to the
knowledge of the accountants when knowledge there is none, a reckless miscstate-
ment, or an opinion based on grounds so flimsy as to lead to the conclusion that
there was no genuine belief in its truth, are all sufficient upon which to base liability.
A refusal to see the obvious, a failure to investigate the doubtful, if sufficiently
gross, may furnish evidence leading to an inference of fraud so as to impose lia-
bility for losses suffered by those who rely on the balance sheet. In other words,
heedlessness and reckless disregard of consequence may take the place of deliberate
intention." It is noteworthy that Finch who as a member of the Appellate Division
had dissented from the judgment of that court for the plaintiff in the Ultramares
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distinction between fraud and negligence. If the defendant has
been guilty of seriously wrongful conduct, we can trust to the jury
to take care of the equities in the situation.
That a fraudulent person should be protected from liability to
third persons who had reason to rely upon the statements seems
defensible only from a purely historical standpoint. The hard-
ships which may attend the imposition of liability for merely
negligent statements do not exist where the statement is knowingly
false. It is true that liability will in many cases be imposed upon
an innocent principal, as in the Ultramares case, but the likelihood
of a fraudulent or bribable agent is far less than that of a negligent
or overcredulous agent. The restriction of liability in such cases
far beyond the liability for negligent conduct causing physical
harm is anomalous. The Ultramares opinion extended liability
for fraud to permit suit by persons whose identity was unknown
to the defendant and whom it was not the primary purpose of the
defendant to defraud. From this point it is but a short step to
permit recovery by persons of a class which the defendant should
have realized would rely upon his misrepresentation whether or
not he had persons of that'sort in mind. It is here that "the as-
sault upon the citadel of privity" should be most vigorous. The
cheat has no barrier of sympathy behind which he can take refuge
when once a breach in the citadel is made.
Warren A. Seavey.48
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL.
case, wrote the opinion, while two members of the court dissented on the ground
that they could find no evidence of wrongdoing other than that resulting from an
honest error of judgment. The curtains which failed to exclude the nose of the
camel are now further parted to admit the head.
48 My colleague, Mr. Thurston, who looked over the manuscript to discern
heresies, permits me to say that the views here stated are in substance those which
he and I have developed and shared in our work together.
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OTHER SIGNIFICANT OPINIONS
The six cases reviewed above are, I believe, representative of Cardozo's
opinions in tort cases. Below are thumbnail sketches of a few of the more
than one hundred opinions in tort cases which illustrate his permeating in-
fluence and his wisdom in decision.
Negligence
Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 219 N. Y. 6o, 113 N. E. 529 (19x6). Fore-
casting the Palsgraf case, liability was imposed upon a person who had stored
nitroglycerin caps where a child found them. The defendant was made "an-
swerable for those consequences that ought to have been foreseen by a rea-
sonably prudent man."
Adams v. Bullock, 227 N. Y. 208, 125 N. E. 93 (i919). The plaintiff, a
boy of twelve, swung a wire from a bridge which he was crossing, causing it
to come into contact with the defendant's trolley wire a few feet below the
parapet of the bridge. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, Cardozo
makes plain that the factors entering into the conception of negligence are
risk on the one hand, utility and expense on the other. "Chance of harm,
though remote, may betoken negligence, if needless. Facility of protection
may impose a duty to protect. With trolley wires, the case is different. In-
sulation is impossible. Guards here and there are of little value. To avert
the possibility of this accident and others like it at one point or another
on the route, the defendant must have abandoned the overhead system and put
the wire underground. Neither its power nor its duty to make the change is
shown."
Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 64, 126 N. E. 814 (1920). In this case is
a superb discussion of the effect of the disobedience of statutes requiring ve-
hicles to have lights when driven on the road, apropos of the discussion
whether the violation of a statute has of itself the same effect as negligence.
Where the failure to obey the statute is a cause of the accident "jurors have
no dispensing power by which they may relax the duty that one traveler on
the highway has under the statute to another. It is error to tell them that
they have. The omission of these lights was a wrong and being wholly un-
excused was also a negligent wrong." Further, "evidence of a collision occur-
ring more than an hour after sundown between a car and an unseen buggy,
proceeding without lights, is evidence from which a causal connection may
be inferred between the collision and the lack of signals .... There may in-
deed be times when the lights on the highway are so many and so bright that
a light on the wagon is superfluous. If that is so, it is for the offender to go
forward with the evidence, and prove that the illumination was a kind of
substitute performance."
Hynes v. New York C. R. R., 231 N. Y. 229, 131 N. E. 898 (1921). A six-
teen-year old boy swam from the west bank of the Harlem River to the east
bank where he climbed upon a springboard which had been fastened to a
bulkhead on the defendant's land and which projected from its property over
the water. The boy had climbed on the bulkhead and proceeded to the end
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of the springboard over the water when he was struck by wires which fell
from one of the defendant's poles. In a colorful opinion, Cardozo declined
to apply the severe common-law rule protecting landowners from liability
to trespassers harmed by static conditions of the land, even though the plank
on which the boy was when struck was a fixture in the defendant's possession,
"Jumping from a boat or a barrel, the boy would have been a bather in the
river. Jumping from the end of a springboard, he was no longer, it is said.
a bather, but a trespasser on a right of way. Rights and duties in systems of
living law are not built upon such quicksands."
Schloendorff v. New York Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, i03 N. E. 92 (1914);
Hamburger v. Cornell University, 24o N. Y. 328, 148 N. E. 539 (1925). In
these two cases, in the first of which recovery was denied against a hospital and
in the second, against a university, Cardozo delineates the extent of immunity
of eleemosynary institutions and the reasons for granting it.
McFarlane v. City of Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, i6o N. E. 391 (1928).
This was an action brought by a woman who stumbled on a slight projection
on the sidewalk, which she had previously noticed. The plaintiff claimed that
the projection constituted a nuisance and that contributory negligence was
not a defense. In reversing the judgment for the plaintiff, the amorphous
nature of nuisance is completely exposed, as is likewise the fallacy of the oft-
repeated statement that contributory negligence is not a defense in an ac-
tion for nuisance. Cardozo points out that wherever the substantial wrong
in a condition alleged to be a nuisance is negligence, the defense of contribu-
tory negligence is as pertinent as in any other negligence case. It is difficult
to see how, after this opinion, courts can continue to state, as applicable to all
forms of nuisance, that contributory negligence is not a defense.
Woloszynowski v. New York C. R. R., 254 N. Y. 2o6, 172 N. E. 471 (1930).
In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, Cardozo reiterates the New York
rule that the last clear chance doctrine does not apply unless the defendant
fails to use reasonable efforts to avert the harm after knowledge of the danger.
He takes account of the short time for averting the harm and allows leeway
after discovery of the facts for an error of judgment. "In the light of the
wisdom that follows the event, we can see that the outcome might have been
better if they had done something less. That is not enough."
Cullings v. Goetz, 256 N. Y. 287, 176 N. E. 397 (1931). The defendant
lessor contracted to keep the premises in repair. He failed to do so and as a
result the plaintiff, a licensee of the lessee, was hurt. Judgment for the plain-
tiff was reversed in spite of what we may assume to be a strong desire by the
court to make the defendant liable in accordance with considerable authority
in the United States and with the statement in the Restatement of Torts, but
contrary to the pre-existing New York rule that the landlord is not liable un-
der these circumstances. In expressing his belief in the vitality of the doc-
trine of stare decisis, Cardozo states: "The doctrine, wise or unwise in its
origin, has worked itself by common acquiescence into the tissues of our law.
It is too deeply imbedded to be superseded or ignored. Hardly a day goes
by in our great centers of population but it is applied by judges and juries in
cases great and small. Countless tenants, suing for personal injuries and
proving nothing more than a breach of agreement, have been dismissed with-
out a remedy in adherence to authority."
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De Haen v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 258 N. Y. 350, 179 N. E. 764 (1932).
In violation of statute, the general contractor for the construction of a build-
ing left a hoistway unguarded. The servants of a subcontractor placed a
radiator close to a shaft and the servants of another subcontractor negligently
knocked the radiator into the shaft, killing a person below. An opinion of
interest because of the manner in which it is pointed out that there is liability
only if the harm was within the hazard against which the statute was enacted
and that while obviously the chief purpose of the statute was to protect work-
men from falling, it may also have been intended to protect them from falling
objects. "A safeguard has been commanded but without distinct enumeration
of the hazards to be avoided. In the revealing light of experience the hazards
to be avoided are disclosed to us as the hazards that ensued."
Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U. S. 98 (1934). This case involved a crossing
accident where the plaintiff had failed to get out of his vehicle as was necessary
to gain a view of a possible approaching train. Cardozo gently but firmly ex-
plodes the idea that most of us received from reading Baltimore & Ohio Ry. v.
Goodman [275 U. S. 66 (1927)], that Mr. Justice Holmes meant to state an
unyielding rule barring from recovery one who failed to stop and leave his ve-
hicle to look, if otherwise the track could not be properly observed.
Fraud
As indicated by the Ultramares decision, Cardozo had no inhibitions against
imposing liability upon those who had misrepresented or had approached the
limits of proper conduct as fiduciaries, the liability frequently being imposed
by the creation of a constructive trust.
Beatty v. Guggenheim, 225 N. Y. 380, 122 N. E. 378 (i919). The opinion
is a notable expression of the rule that the court will not permit an agent
to profit by taking advantage of information acquired in the course of his
agency or arising out of it.
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 64 N. E. 545 (1928). This opinion
clarifies the principle of the Beatty case and sets up a high standard of con-
duct for one engaged in a joint enterprise with another by imposing a con-
structive trust in favor of the other upon a large amount of property, of which
only a portion was acquired because of the relation.
Junius Construction Co. v. Cohen, 257 N. Y. 393, 178 N. E. 672 (x93).
Cardozo makes it plain that one cannot properly reveal two comparatively
harmless incumbrances in order to conceal the existence of a very damageable
one. One is guilty of concealment if, having undertaken or professed to men-
tion incumbrances, he stops half way, listing only those which are unimpor-
tant and keeping silent as to the others.
McCandless, Rec'rv. Furlaud, 296 U.S. 140 (935). A far-reaching opinion,
given for the majority of a divided court, extending the liability of corporate
promoters. By the expedient of owning all the shares at the time of their
transfer of grossly overvalued property that was insufficient in value to satisfy
the bonds issued by the company, the promoters vainly sought to escape
liability to the receiver for the overvaluation. " No consent of shareholders
could make such conduct lawful when challenged by the receiver as the repre-
sentative of creditors."
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